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ALEPH: A LEADERLESS, ASYNCHRONOUS, BYZANTINE
FAULT TOLERANT CONSENSUS PROTOCOL
ADAM GA¸GOL∗† AND MICHAL S´WIE¸TEK∗†
Abstract. In this paper we propose Aleph, a leaderless, fully asynchronous,
Byzantine fault tolerant consensus protocol for ordering messages exchanged
among processes. It is based on a distributed construction of a partially or-
dered set and the algorithm for reaching a consensus on its extension to a total
order. To achieve the consensus, the processes perform computations based
only on a local copy of the data structure, however, they are bound to end with
the same results. Our algorithm uses a dual-threshold coin-tossing scheme as a
randomization strategy and establishes the agreement in an expected constant
number of rounds. In addition, we introduce a fast way of validating messages
that can occur prior to determining the total ordering.
This version of the protocol is deprecated. For current version see [6].
1. Introduction
State machine replication is a paradigm for implementing fault-tolerant services
using distributed servers communicating over an unreliable network. At the heart
of such systems lie consensus algorithms responsible for establishing an agreement
among replicas on a value or an action. In a real life scenario a certain number
of replicas can be faulty and the communication between them can suffer delays.
Therefore, one of the crucial properties of consensus algorithm is their resilience to
node failure and network delay. The strongest guarantees of such a resilience are,
respectively, Byzantine fault tolerance and full asynchronicity. The former assumes
that faulty processes can deviate from the protocol in a completely arbitrary way,
from simple crashes, to malicious behavior aimed at disturbing the consensus, fully
coordinated between all faulty processes. Full asynchronicity assumes that delays
on messages sent between users can be arbitrarily long, but finite (every message
will eventually be delivered). For an overview of Byzantine consensus algorithms
over asynchronous networks see [3].
One of the first notable examples of consensus algorithms is the original Paxos [7]
algorithm and its later incarnation Raft [9]. The main downside of their approach is
the requirement to choose a leader who is responsible for coordination of establishing
consensus. The problem of such an approach is evident, since at any point in time
the designated leader is a single point of failure of the whole protocol.
A different approach, Nakamoto consensus [11], based on blockchain, resolves
the problem of choosing a leader in a sense that the process producing a new
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block is impossible to predict beforehand. As such, the protocol is immune to a
single point of failure. However, systems based on Nakamoto consensus suffer from
serious scalability issues and their intrinsic tradeoff between security and speed [10].
Moreover, due to the longest chain rule, processes can never be sure whether the
consensus has been reached, it is only guaranteed with high probability.
Another crucial property of a consensus algorithm is liveness, or a guarantee
that agreement is eventually reached between all non-faulty processes. The cele-
brated FLP theorem [5] states that no deterministic and asynchronous algorithm
can achieve liveness in the presence of at least one faulty process. A standard
technique of circumventing FLP theorem is to give up determinism by introduc-
ing randomization in a form of coin tossing. Such randomized Byzantine consensus
algorithms can be divided into two main classes based on their randomization strat-
egy. In the first class, all processes have access to one shared coin; in the second
class, each process uses its own local coin. The main difference between these two
classes lies in the expected number of coin tossing rounds required for an algorithm
to terminate. Shared coin protocols can terminate in expected constant number of
rounds, while local coin protocols typically require an expected exponential number
of rounds. On the other hand, the shared coin strategy typically requires a trusted
dealer to distribute coin shares among the replicas.
Hashgraph [1] is an example of a consensus algorithm that satisfies all the afore-
mentioned properties, i.e. it is randomized, leaderless, asynchronous, and Byzan-
tine fault tolerant. However, it uses a local coin randomization strategy and has an
expected exponential number of rounds needed to terminate1.
In this paper, we introduce Aleph, a new distributed consensus algorithm that
suffers none of the above shortcomings. Our protocol is leaderless, asynchronous,
Byzantine fault tolerant and guarantees liveness with an expected constant number
of rounds needed to terminate. We use a technique inspired by the idea of a
dual-threshold coin-tossing scheme from [2], modified in a way that removes the
reliance on a trusted dealer in the initialization phase, making the Aleph protocol
fully leaderless. In our communication protocol, processes exchange information by
creating and sharing with each other units which can contain arbitrary data. At
the moment of their creation, newer units are connected to the older ones and a
structure emerges in a similar fashion to events partially ordered by the happened-
before relation introduced by Lamport [8]. The total ordering of units is computed
locally, based only on the partial order structure, and is guaranteed to be the same
for all processes. This approach, similar to Hashgraph’s virtual voting [1], allows
for constant average communication complexity when high message throughput is
present.
In addition, we introduce a fast way of validating certain types of messages.
It can be performed prior to establishing the total ordering and may be used in
applications such as token transfer systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce necessary
cryptographic tools and formally define the network model. The basic communica-
tion protocol with its key properties is presented in Subsections 3.1-3.3. Subsections
3.4 and 3.5 are devoted to the core ordering protocol and proving its properties.
Finally, in Subsection 3.7, we introduce the concept of fast unit validation.
1This can be seen by computing the exponentially small probability of the Hashgraph’s coin
round settling the consensus in case of 1/3N − 1 Byzantine processes.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Cryptographic Primitives.
2.1.1. Digital Signatures. A digital signature scheme can be used for message au-
thentication. The Aleph protocol works on top of any digital signature scheme with
the following properties:
(1) provides a verifier a proof that the signed message was created by a known
sender (authentication),
(2) does not allow a signer of a message from denying the creation of the message
(non-repudiation), and
(3) does not allow the message to be altered in any way (integrity).
2.1.2. Threshold Coin-Tossing Scheme. The concept of (n, t, k) dual-threshold coin-
tossing scheme was first introduced by Cachin, Kursawe and Shoup [2]. It allows n
parties to share a coin toss in a scenario where up to t of them can be corrupted.
The parties generate shares of the coin based on a nonce C, and k such shares
are required to construct the value of the coin for that particular nonce. In our
scenario, we use t = 1/3N − 1 and k = 2/3N + 1.
The original threshold coin requires a trusted dealer to distribute keys to all
participants. To circumvent this requirement, we use n different threshold coins, one
for each process participating in the consensus. We introduce a notation TCi(C) to
denote the value of the threshold coin dealt by i-th process for a nonce C. Moreover,
we use TCij(C) to denote the j-th process’s share of the threshold coin dealt by the
i-th process for a nonce C.
2.1.3. Common Random Permutation. A common permutation scheme is a simple
procedure producing a sequence of permutations of the processes based on the set
of their public keys. The algorithm takes a nonce (natural number) and the set of
all public keys as input and outputs a pseudo-random permutation of the processes,
which cannot be controlled without controlling all the public keys.
For a nonce k, the permutation σk is constructed by first computing X as the
XOR of all public keys. Then, each public key V Ki is iteratively hashed k times
to compute the value Xi = hash
k(V Ki) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Finally, the value Xi is
XORed with X to produce Yi = XiXORX . The lexicographic ordering of all Yi’s is
the desired permutation σk. Note that any party that knows all the public keys is
able to locally compute such permutation for every nonce k.
2.2. Model and problem statement. The Aleph protocol operates on a network
of N processes and tolerates up to 1/3N − 1 faulty processes. Faulty processes can
deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way, including both crashes and Byzantine
faults. In other words, we assume 1/3N − 1 processes are controlled by a malicious
adversary. All remaining 2/3N+1 processes are correct and fully follow the protocol.
We assume each pair of processes is connected by a reliable authenticated chan-
nel, but the delivery schedule is under full control of the adversary, i.e., we consider
a fully asynchronous scenario. Moreover, the adversary is able to listen to all com-
munication, but cannot modify its content2.
2Such channels can be easily emulated on top of unreliable channels via digital signature system
and resending transmission or by applying error-correcting codes.
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The Aleph protocol aims to establish an atomic broadcast (or total order broad-
cast) between all processes in the network.
Definition 2.1. An atomic broadcast is a protocol of message broadcasts between
processes satisfying the following properties in the presence of a malicious adversary:
(i) Correctness - all correct processes need to agree on validity and ordering of
all messages,
(ii) Integrity - once a message T is agreed to be placed in the ordering, the
ordering of T and all messages before it is final, i.e., no more messages can
be decided to be earlier than T , and
(iii) Liveness - every message proposed by a correct process will eventually be
agreed upon by all correct processes.
3. Aleph Protocol
3.1. Basic Definitions. The basic building block of the protocol is a unit, a data
structure created by a single process and propagated throughout the network. Units
are used as containers for messages, and the protocol uses them to guarantee the
consistency of the system.
Definition 3.1. An object U of a class unit has the following attributes:
U.parents - hashes of two parent units,
U.message - a message contained in the unit,
U.creator - an ID of the process that created U ,
U.signature - a digital signature of the unit creator,
U.coinshares - a set of threshold coin shares attached to the unit.
There are two special types of units that can contain some additional attributes:
the genesis unit and dealing units. The genesis unit is the first created unit. For
each process, a dealing unit is the first unit created by that process after the genesis
unit.
We also note that all attributes are set by the unit creator and never change.
In addition, by the hash of a unit U , denoted as hash(U), we mean the value
of a fixed cryptographic hash function (for example, sha256d) on the bit string
representation of the unit object. We also observe that as time progresses, the set
of all units grows, since the algorithm only creates units and never destroys them.
Notation 3.2. Let Pt denote the set of all units at a time t. If the time is not
relevant or it is known from the context, we will omit the superscript t and write
just P.
Since every unit contains hashes of two other units, a structure is imposed on
the whole set of units. This structure is called a partial order and is defined in the
following way.
Definition 3.3. Let U and V be units in the set P. We say that V is above U and
denote it as V > U if U = V or there exists a sequence of units, U0, U1, . . . , Un ∈ P,
such that U0 = U, Un = V , and hash(Ui−1) ∈ Ui.parents for all 1 6 i 6 n.
The set P together with the partial order 6 is called a partially ordered set, or
a poset for short. We will abuse the notation and call the set P a poset if it does
not lead to confusion.
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A set U of units forms a chain in a poset P if for all U, V ∈ U , U 6 V or V 6 U ,
i.e. any two units in the set are comparable by the relation 6.
Due to the latency of information exchange, processes in the network will not
have instantaneous knowledge about every unit. Therefore, at a time t, each process
will be aware of only a part of the whole poset Pt (a great majority of it, but with
exclusion of some of the most recent units) and the following notion arises naturally.
Notation 3.4. For a process A at a time t, we define A’s local view of the poset
Pt as the part of Pt that A knows and denote it as PtA. We use the term global
view for the whole poset Pt.
For a set of units U , we define a supporting set for U , denoted by supp(U), to
be a set of all processes which created at least one unit in U . Since we will often
be interested only in the size of the support for the given set, we introduce the
following short notation:
#s U = #supp
(
U
)
.
Definition 3.5. Let U, V ∈ P be units, U 6 V , and U = {W | U 6W 6 V }. We
say that the unit V is high above the unit U if #s U > 2/3N . We denote this as
V ≫ U . In addition, we will also say that U is high below V .
The next few definitions introduce additional structure on the poset P and is
used to track information as it is spread throughout the network, as explained
further in Lemmas 3.10 and 3.11.
Definition 3.6. For a unit U , the level of U is recursively defined as:
L(U) =


0 if U is the genesis unit, or
m if #s
{
V ≪ U : L(V ) = m
}
< 2/3N
m+ 1 otherwise
where m = max
V <U
L(V ).
Definition 3.7. A unit U is a prime unit if there does not exist a unit V < U
issued by U ’s creator such that L(U) = L(V ).
Definition 3.8. Let U and V be prime units. If U ≪ V and L(V ) = L(U) + 1,
then U is called a prime ancestor of V . Sets of all prime ancestors of a unit U is
denoted as ↓1(U).
For technical reasons, we will need to sum a series of the following type.
Lemma 3.9. Let q ∈ R with |q| < 1. Then∑
n>0
nqn = q(1−q)2 .
As a notational convention, if f is a function with a domain X and S ⊂ X , we
use f(S) to denote the image of S by f .
Finally, to make formulas with predicates easier to read, we use the Iverson
bracket convention throughout the paper:
[P ] =
{
1 if predicate P is true
0 if predicate P is false.
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3.2. Communication Protocol. The Aleph protocol organizes the exchange of
messages by participants (represented as processes) through the use of atomic mes-
sage containers called units and establishes a consensus on the ordering of all the
messages. The core communication protocol consists of two parts: (1) locally build-
ing the poset by adding new units to it (Algorithm 1 create unit) and (2) syn-
chronizing the local views among the processes (Algorithm 2 sync). We note that
every process in the network starts by running an infinite loop. At every iteration,
a process runs the create unit function, and at every K steps, it runs the sync
function, where K is a global parameter. All the algorithms will be written in
the convention that every function will have the identifier of a process as a first
parameter.
New units are created by a process A via Algorithm 1. Let V be the last unit
created by A. First, the process A randomly chooses U1, the first parent of a new
unit U , to be a maximal element in his local view which is above V (line 1). Next,
A randomly chooses U2, the second parent, to be any maximal element in its local
view (line 2). More specifically,
U1 ∈ max{W ∈ PA | W > V } and U2 ∈ maxPA.
Then, the process A chooses a message (it may be empty) and includes it in U (line
3). Note that we produce new units even if there are no new messages to include.
Then, algorithm threshold coin is called, which decides whether a share of the
threshold coin should be included in the produced unit and includes it in such a
case (the algorithm threshold coin as is explained in detail in Subsection 3.4).
Finally, the local view of A is updated by adding U to it (line 5).
Algorithm 1: create unit(A)
1 U1 ← a random maximal unit in PA which is above A’s last created unit
2 U2 ← a random maximal unit in PA
3 Create a unit U with U1, U2 as parents and include a message if available
4 threshold coin(A,U)
5 add U to PA
As described in Algorithm 1 line 1, each unit created by a process needs to be
above all units previously created by this process, i.e. units created by a single
process always form a chain in the poset. If a faulty process B creates a set F of
two or more units which share a first parent, then all units from F are mutually
incomparable and they will be referred to as forking units.
The synchronization part is done by means of Algorithm sync. The process A
randomly chooses another process B (line 1) and, if the process B responds, A
exchanges information with B about which units each has in its local view (lines
4− 5). Using this information, it is possible to exchange only units lacking in A’s
and B’s local views, as done in lines 6− 7. The received units’ signatures are then
validated (line 8) and if no sign of signature forging is detected, the units are added
to the local views of A. The update of the local view of a process A by a set of
new units UB is done one unit at a time in a chosen total ordering extending the
ordering of UB (the choice of this total ordering is irrelevant for the algorithm and
does not influence the final total order of messages created by the protocol). If at
least one signature is not correct, the synchronization is rejected (lines 10−11) and
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the connection with B is closed. The random synchronization scheme of this type
is usually referred in the literature as a gossip protocol [4].
Algorithm 2: sync(A)
1 connect to a randomly chosen process B and send ID
2 if received incorrect ID from B then
3 return
4 send information about units in PA
5 receive information about units in PB
6 send set of units UA = PA \ PB
7 receive set of units UB = PB \ PA
8 if all signatures in UB are correct then
9 add units in UB to the local view PA
10 else
11 reject synchronization
3.3. Structural Poset Properties.
Lemma 3.10. If U0, U1, V0, V1 are units such that U1 ≫ U0 and V1 ≫ V0, then
either U1 > V0 or V1 > U0.
Proof. Let U be the set of units between U0 and U1, and let V be the set of units
between V0 and V1. Since #s U > 2/3N, #s V > 2/3N and less than 1/3N of the
processes are faulty, then there exists a correct process C ∈ supp(U) ∩ supp(V).
Because C ∈ U ∩V , then C had to create units U, V (not necessarily distinct) such
that U1 > U > U0 and V1 > V > V0. Since C is correct, all units created by C are
totally ordered, so either U > V or V > U . The former implies U1 > U > V > V0,
the latter V1 > V > U > U0. 
Lemma 3.11. If P is a local view and U, V ∈ P are units such that V ≫ U , then
U is high below every unit of level L(V ) + 2 and higher.
Proof. Let W be a unit of level L(V ) + 2 + l for some l > 0. Then, let UW be the
set of all units of level L(V ) + 1 + l that are high below W and let UV,U be the
set of all units between V and U . Both of the sets UW and UV,U have support of
size at least 2/3N , so there must be a correct process A ∈ supp(UW) ∩ supp(UV,U).
Since A is correct, it had to create units WA ∈ UW and UA ∈ UU,V such that either
UA > WA or WA > UA. Since L(WA) = L(V ) + 1 + l and L(UA) 6 L(V ), the
former is not possible. The latter implies that W ≫ WA > U . 
Lemma 3.12. If more than 2/3N processes are correct, then the level of the poset
will grow indefinitely with probability 1, even in an asynchronous scenario.
Proof. Let P be the global view at some time t, and let L(P) = l. We will show
that with probability 1 the poset will grow to level l + 1. Let H be the set of all
correct processes, and let an atomic round be an interval in which at least 2/3N
processes in H have issued a unit and synchronized with another process in H.
Since correct processes are choosing partners to synchronize randomly, consecutive
atomic rounds will continue to occur after time t with probability 1.
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Let U be a unit in P . Note that information about new units spreads expo-
nentially in the network in terms of atomic rounds. Hence, in average, after a
logarithmic number of atomic rounds, a unit V will be created that is high above
U . Let UU,V be the set of units between U and V .
At the time when a unit W ≫ V is created, the poset will reach the level l + 1,
since W needs to be high above every V ∈ UU,V via transitivity and #s UU,V >
2/3N . 
3.4. Leaderless Threshold Coin. Usually threshold coin-tossing schemes require
a trusted party to secretly deal pairs of private and public keys in the network (see
Subsection 2.1.2). Since Aleph is designed to work in a leaderless setting, where
no such trusted party exists, the protocol requires additional steps to construct a
Leaderless Threshold Coin.
Roughly speaking, the construction will provide access to the common coin for
every user at times when the coin is needed during the total ordering procedure.
The core idea is to make every process in the network deal its own threshold coin
and then alternate between them, ensuring that at least half of them will be fair.
We introduce a notation TCi(C) to denote the value of the threshold coin dealt
by i-th process for a nonce C. Moreover, we use TCij(C) to denote j-th process’s
share of the threshold coin dealt by i-th process for a nonce C.
The keys required to construct the threshold coin shares of TCi will be enclosed
by process i, the coin’s dealer, in its first unit produced after the genesis unit which
we call the dealing unit.
The following notion from the hypergraph theory will be required. Let X be a
set, and F = {S1, . . . , Sk} be a family of subsets such that Si ⊆ X (i.e., X is a set
of vertices and S is a set of hyperedges). A set T ⊆ X is called a transversal of F
if it has a nonempty intersection with all Si’s.
When a process A runs Algorithm 3, A first checks whether U is A’s first unit
after the genesis unit (line 2). In case it is, for every other process B, A creates
a pair of validation and secret keys for B’s share of the coin dealt by A (line 5),
encrypts it with B’s public key and embeds the pair within the unit U (line 6).
Next, A checks if U is a prime unit of level greater than 4 (line 7). If U satisfies
these conditions, A creates the family F of sets of dealing units below V , for every
unit V of level less than or equal L(U) − 3 which is below U (lines 8 − 11). Note
that here the set of dealing units below each V is a hyperedge and that F is a set of
hyperedges. Then, a transversal TU of F is constructed iteratively (lines 12− 21),
i.e. new dealing units are added to TU in the order defined by the permutation
σL(U) until they form a transversal. The set TTC of shares of coins dealt in units
forming the transversal TU is then embedded in U (line 22).
While it may look like the protocol requires a lot more overhead due to the
necessity of storing coin shares in units, the following lemma shows that only a
very small number of such shares are necessary on average.
Lemma 3.13. The expected number of units in the transversal TU constructed in
Algorithm 3 is not bigger than 3/2.
Proof. Let A be a process, U be a prime unit created by A of level at least 4, and F
be the family created as in Algorithm 3 for which the transversal TU is constructed.
Moreover, let V ∈ PA be a prime unit such that U > V and 1 6 L(V ) 6 L(U)− 3.
Due to Lemma 3.11, every unit of level L(U) is high above every unit high below
ALEPH CONSENSUS PROTOCOL 9
Algorithm 3: threshold coin(A,U)
1 i← A’s index
2 if U is A’s first unit after the genesis unit then
3 for B ∈ processes do
4 j ← B’s index
5 create a pair (V Kij, SK
i
j) of keys for B’s share of coin TC
i
j
6 embed (V Kij, SK
i
j) encrypted with B’s public key PKB within U
7 if U ∈ PA is a prime unit and L(U) > 4 then
8 F ← ∅
9 for V ∈
{
W ∈ PA :W 6 U, L(W ) 6 L(U)− 3, W ∈ prime(P)
}
do
10 S ← set of all dealing units below V
11 append S to F
12 TU ← ∅
13 TTC ← ∅
14 k ← 1
15 while TU is not a transversal of F do
16 j ← σL(U)(k)
17 B ← j-th process
18 if B’s dealing unit is in ∪F then
19 append B’s dealing unit to TU
20 embed TCji (L(U)) within TTC
21 k ← k + 1
22 append TTC to U
V . Hence, the set ↓1(V ) of at least 2/3N dealing units is in every set in F . Thus,
in any permutation σ, every dealing unit has a probability at least 2/3 of being
the transversal by itself. By summing the geometric sequence, we obtain that the
transversal is constructed after at most 3/2 elements on average. 
Due to the way coin shares are included in the units, not every coin value will
be available on every level. To control which coins will be available, we introduce
the following notion.
Definition 3.14. Let k > 1 and V be a prime unit. We define a first available
index for level k and the unit V (FAIk(V) for short) to be the lowest index i in σk
such that i-th process’s dealing unit is below V .
Lemma 3.15. Let A be a process, PA be a local view, let V ∈ PA be a prime unit,
let U ∈ PA, U > V be a prime unit of level at least L(V ) + 3, created by the i-th
process. Then, U contains the coin share TC
FAIL(U)(V)
i (L(U)).
Proof. In Algorithm 3, the procedure of adding coin shares to the unit U continues
until a transversal of F is constructed. Since the set of all dealing units below V
belongs to F and coin shares are added to U in the order defined by σL(U), we have
that the FAIL(U)(V)-th share of the coin of i-th process for the nonce L(U), or in
our notation TC
FAIL(U)(V)
i (L(U)), has to be contained in the unit U . 
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Lemma 3.16. Let A be a process and let V ∈ PA be a prime unit. Then, for every
k such that L(PA) > k > L(V ) + 3, the value of the coin TCFAIk(V)(k) is possible
to compute in PA.
Proof. Since L(PA) > k, PA contains a set S of at least 2/3N prime units at level
k produced by different processes. Fix U ∈ S and let W be a prime unit of level
L(V ) + 1 created by A. By applying Lemma 3.11 to W and V , we obtain that
U > V , as L(U) > L(W ) + 2.
Hence, we obtain by Lemma 3.15 that, every unit in S contains its share of the
coin TCFAIk(V)(k), which allows us to reach the required threshold and compute
the coin value. 
3.5. Timing units. The algorithm for establishing the total ordering of all units
has two stages. First, it chooses some prime units to be timing units (Definition
3.21), which serve as common reference points for the total ordering. Then, all the
remaining units are totally ordered with respect to the timing units. The main
challenge is to guarantee a consistent choice of the timing units. We want to ensure
that different processes choose the same timing units despite differences in their
local views.
In this subsection, we define auxiliary notions needed for choosing timing units
and describe their fundamental properties. The idea for the functions Π and ∆ as
well as the use of the threshold coin for breaking stalemates was inspired by the
ABBA protocol introduced in [2]. The algorithm for the total ordering is presented
and analyzed in the next subsection.
On every level l of a poset, we choose one timing unit among all prime units on
that level. The choice is done in two phases:
(1) in the decision phase, for every prime unit of level l, the decision on its feasi-
bility as a timing unit is made by means of the function ∆, and
(2) in the choice phase, among all feasible prime units of level l, the one which is
first in the permutation σl is chosen to be the timing unit for that level.
The decision phase is performed for every prime unit separately. Throughout
this section Uc denotes a fixed prime unit which is considered as a candidate for a
timing unit. The decision phase for Uc is organized into rounds, during which other
prime units decide on the feasibility of Uc as a timing unit. Each round consists of
computing values of functions ∆Uc and ΠUc for prime units belonging to one level
of the poset. During k-th round (k = 0, 1, . . . ) all prime units with level L(Uc) + k
are considered. There are three types of rounds: preliminary rounds (denoted with
⊥), even rounds (denoted with 0), and odd rounds (denoted with 1).
Before stating the definitions of ∆Uc and ΠUc , we need to introduce several
auxiliary functions. The first one computes the type of round to which a prime
unit U belongs:
RUC (U) =
{
(L(U)− L(Uc)) mod 2 if L(U) > L(Uc) + 1
⊥ if L(U) 6 L(Uc) + 1,
Next, we define operators counting results of any given function f at the previous
level. The supermajority operator SupMaj(S, f) counts values of function f in the
set S and returns the one with at least 2/3N occurrences, or ⊥ in case no such value
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exists:
SupMaj(S, f) =
{
value if #s{U ∈ S : f(U) = value} > 2/3N
⊥ otherwise
The existence operator Exist(S, f) returns 0 or 1 if such value exists in f(S) (with
the preference for 1), or ⊥ otherwise:
Exist(S, f) =


1 if 1 ∈ f(S)
0 if 1 6∈ f(S) and 0 ∈ f(S)
⊥ otherwise.
The randomized existence operator ExistTC(S, f) returns 0 or 1 if such a value exists
in f(S) (with the preference for 1), otherwise it returns the value of the threshold
coin TCFAIL(S)(Uc)(L(S)), where L(S) = max{L(U) : U ∈ S}. Let us note that we
will use only sets S of constant level, i.e., L(S) = L(U) for all U ∈ S.
ExistTC(S, f) =


1 if 1 ∈ f(S)
0 if 1 6∈ f(S) and 0 ∈ f(S)
TCFAIL(S)(Uc)(L(S)) otherwise.
Using the above operators, we recursively define the proposal function ΠUc and
the decision function ∆Uc :
ΠUc(U) =


SupMaj(↓1(U),ΠUc) if RUC (U) = 1
ExistTC(↓1(U),ΠUc) if RUC (U) = 0
[U > Uc] if RUC (U) = ⊥
and
∆Uc(U) =


Exist(↓1(U),∆Uc) if RUC (U) = 1
SupMaj(↓1(U),ΠUc) if RUC (U) = 0
⊥ if RUC (U) = ⊥.
The core of the decision phase is the ∆Uc function. As proven in the following
technical lemma, it provides the decision procedure with the desired properties of
unanimity, finiteness and necessity of positive decisions.
Lemma 3.17. Let A be a process, let PA be a local view, let Uc ∈ PA be a prime
unit. The functions ΠUc and ∆Uc safisfy the following properties:
(i) if ΠUc(U) 6= ⊥ for some prime unit U ∈ PA such that RUC (U) = 1, then
ΠUc(V ) ∈ {ΠUc(U),⊥} for every prime unit V ∈ PA such that L(U) = L(V )
(single supermajority),
(ii) if ∆Uc(U) 6= ⊥ for a prime unit U ∈ PA, then ∆Uc(V ) = ∆Uc(U) for every
prime unit V ∈ PA such that L(V ) > L(U) + 2 (unanimous decision),
(iii) if ΠUc(U) = TC
FAIl−1(Uc)(l − 1) for every prime unit U ∈ PA of level l =
L(Uc) + 2k, for some fixed k > 1, then for every prime unit V of level l + 2
or higher there is ∆Uc(V ) 6= ⊥ (finiteness of decision procedure),
(iv) if U1 ∈ PA is a prime unit of level L(U1) = l + 1, l > 0, such that there is
no other prime unit of that level below U1, then for every Uc ∈↓1(U1) and
every prime unit U4 ∈ PA of level l + 4 there is ∆Uc(U4) = 1 (necessity of
positive decisions), and
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(v) if V ∈ PA is a prime unit such that L(V ) = L(Uc) + 4 and Uc ≮ V , then
∆Uc(W ) ∈ {⊥, 0} for every W of level at least L(Uc)+4 (negative decisions
for hidden units).
Proof.
(i) Suppose by way of contradiction that for some prime unit V ∈ PA with L(U) =
L(V ), there is ΠUc(U) = 1 and ΠUc(V ) = 0. By the definition of ΠUc , we have
that SupMaj(↓1(U),ΠUc) = 1 and SupMaj(↓1(V),ΠUc) = 0. This implies that
on level L(U) − 1 there are sets SU and SV containing at least 2/3N prime units
issued by different processes, such that ΠUc(U
′) = 0 and ΠUc(V
′) = 1 for all
U ′ ∈ SU , V ′ ∈ SV . Since both SU and SV are composed of units issued by at least
2/3N different processes, then there exists a correct process who has issued a prime
unit that is in both SU and SV . This gives a contradiction, since a correct process
could issue at most one prime unit of the given level, which could belong to only
one of the sets SU , SV , depending on its ΠUc value.
(ii) Let U be a prime unit of the lowest possible level such that ∆Uc(U) 6= ⊥. One
can readily observe that the general case follows from this one. For an odd round,
the function ∆ differs from ⊥ only in the case when ∆ is different from ⊥ on the
previous level, hence we have RUC (U) = 0. The definition of ∆ implies that there is
a set SU ⊂↓1(Uc) of at least 2/3N prime units of level L(U)− 1 created by different
processes and that ΠUc(V ) = ∆Uc(U) for every V ∈ SU . Because #sSU > 2/3N ,
at least 1/3N + 1 units were created by correct processes. Then, every prime unit
W of level L(U) needs to be high above at least one unit in SU issued by a correct
process. Hence,
ΠUc(W ) = ExistTC(↓1(U),ΠUc) = ∆Uc(U).
As a result, for every unit W1 of level L(U) + 1,
ΠUc(W1) = SupMaj(↓1(W1),ΠUc) = ∆Uc(U).
Finally, for every unit W2 of level L(U) + 2, we obtain
∆Uc(W2) = SupMaj(↓1(W2),ΠUc) = ∆Uc(U).
(iii) By the assumption, we have for some v ∈ {0, 1} that ΠUc(U) = v for every
prime unit U of level l. By the definition of ΠUc , for every W of level l + 1 and
above, ΠUc(V ) = v. Finally, by the definition of ∆, for any V of level at least l+2,
∆Uc(V ) 6= ⊥.
(iv) Let Uc be a unit in ↓1(U1) and SUc,U1 be the set of all units between Uc and
U1. Since #s SUc,U1 > 2/3N , there exists at least 1/3N + 1 correct processes in
supp(SUc,U1). Now let U2 be any prime unit of level l + 2 and A be a correct
process in supp(SUc,U1) ∩ supp(↓1(U2)). Moreover, let UA be a unit issued by A
in SUc,U1 and U
′
A be the prime unit issued by A on level l + 1. Since A is correct,
UA 6 U1 and U
′
A ≮ U1 (due to the assumption that no prime unit of U1’s level is
below it), we get that U ′A > UA and hence U2 ≫ U
′
A > UA > Uc. Since U
′
A > Uc,
we have that
ΠUc(U
′
A) = [U
′
A > Uc] = 1.
Next, due to U2 ≫ U ′A, we also have that
ΠUc(U2) = ExistTC(↓1(U2),ΠUc) = 1.
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Since the choice of U2 was arbitrary, we observe that Π(U
′
2, U0) = 1 for every prime
unit U ′2 of level l + 2. Hence
ΠUc(U3) = SupMaj(↓1(U3),ΠUc) = 1
for every U3 of level l + 3. Finally, for every U4 of level l + 4 we obtain
∆Uc(U4) = SupMaj(↓1(U4),ΠUc) = 1.
(v) Let Uc and V be as in the assumptions. By the contraposition of Lemma 3.11,
we have that no prime unit of level L(Uc) + 2 can be high above Uc. Hence, for
every U1 < U2 < U3 < U4 of levels L(Ui) = L(Uc) + i, the following holds:
ΠUc(U1) = [U1 > Uc] = 0
ΠUc(U2) = ExistTC(↓1(U2),ΠUc) = 0,
ΠUc(U3) = SupMaj(↓1(U3),ΠUc) = 0, and
∆Uc(U4) = SupMaj(↓1(U),ΠUc) = 0.
Since U4 was chosen arbitrarily, the same is true for any unit W of level L(Uc) + 4
and for all levels above. This is due to the recursive definition of ∆ for odd rounds
and (ii).

The following two definitions formalize the concepts of the decision and choice
phases that are required for the selection of a timing unit.
Definition 3.18. Let A be a process. Let PA be a local view and U ∈ PA be a
prime unit. We say that PA decides b ∈ {0, 1} on U if there exists a level l > L(U)
such that for all prime units V of level l, we have that ∆U (V ) = b.
Definition 3.19. Let A be a process. Let PA be a local view and U ∈ PA be a
prime unit created by a process B of index i. We say that PA chooses U if the
following conditions are met:
(1) PA decides 1 for U , and
(2) for all j prior to i in the ordering given by σL(U), a prime unit or a set of
forking prime units created by a process j on the level L(U) are decided 0 by
PA.
Remark 3.20. Let A be a process and t be a time when the local view PtA chooses
a prime unit U . There is a possibility that at some later time t′ > t, a prime unit
U ′ of level L(U) that is prior to U in the ordering given by σL(U) will be added to
the local view Pt
′
A . By (v) of Lemma 3.17, such a unit can only be decided with a
value of 0 in Pt
′
A . Hence, the above notion of choosing is well defined.
Using the above construction, we are now able to define timing units, which
have a crucial property of being unanimously chosen by all correct processes. This
property makes them suitable for setting a common chronology of events in an
asynchronous scenario.
Definition 3.21. Let A be a process. Let PA be a local view. A chain of units
T0, T1, ... ∈ PA of levels L(Ti) = i, which are chosen by PA, is called a timing chain,
and each Ti is called a timing unit.
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In the next two results, we provide bounds on the average number of levels after
which a decision on a prime unit occurs (Lemma 3.22) and the average number of
levels after which a timing unit is chosen (Theorem 3.23).
Lemma 3.22. Let A be a process. At the moment of a creation of a prime unit
Uc in a local view PA, the expected number of rounds required for the decision on
Uc in PA is not bigger than 10.
Proof. During the process of deciding for Uc, coin values will be chosen among all
threshold coins dealt by units high below Uc, i.e., the coins dealt by at least 2/3N
different processes. Since there is less than 1/3N faulty processes, over half of these
coins are dealt by a correct process and hence their result cannot be predicted until
enough units with their shares are produced. Within the scope of this proof, we will
refer to such coins as a fair. The above implies that there is at least 1/2 probability
that the coin TCFAIl(Uc)(l) is fair, for every l > L(Uc) + 3.
Fix k > 0, and let U be a prime unit of level l = L(Uc) + 2k. The coin used to
compute ΠUc(U) is TC
FAIl−1(Uc)(l−1), and when the poset reaches level l its value
is possible to compute by Lemma 3.16.
Now, let v ∈ {0, 1} be a value (which exists by Lemma 3.17(i)) such that for
every V of level l − 1, there is ΠUc(V ) ∈ {v,⊥}. Then, for every Ul of level l we
have
ΠUc(Ul) = ExistTC(↓1(Ul),ΠUc) ∈ {v,TC
FAIl−1(Uc)(l− 1)}.
After the coin reveal, if TCFAIl−1(Uc)(l − 1) = v, then, in the next round for every
Ul+1 ∈ Sl+1,
ΠUc(Ul+1) = SupMaj(↓1(Ul+1),ΠUc) = v.
As a consequence, in the next round, we obtain
∆Uc(Ul+2) = SupMaj(↓1(Ul+2),ΠUc) = v
for every Ul+2 ∈ PA of level l+ 2. Finally, applying Lemma 3.17(ii) to ∆Uc(Ul+2),
we observe that if TCFAIl−1(Uc)(l− 1) = v, then the unit Uc is decided on the level
l+ 4.
Note that if TCFAIl−1(Uc) is a fair coin then P
(
TCFAIl−1(Uc) = v
)
= 1/2, and
hence the unconditional probability that TCFAIl−1(Uc)(l−1) = v is at least 1/4. From
the above considerations we have that the expected number of rounds necessary to
decide on Uc is not greater than
4 + 1/4
∑
i>0
2i
(
3/4
)i
= 4 + 1/2
∑
i>0
i
(
3/4
)i
= 4 + 1/2 · 12 = 10,
where the third equality comes from the summation of the series via Lemma 3.9. 
Theorem 3.23. At the moment of a creation of the first prime unit of level l+ 2,
l > 0, the expected number of rounds required for the choice of a timing unit on the
level l is less than 9.
Proof. Let U1 be a prime unit of the level l + 1, such that no other prime unit of
that level is below it. By Lemma 3.17(iv), we know that every unit Uc ∈↓1(U1) will
be positively decided at the level l+4, and since #s(↓1(U1)) > 2/3N , we have that
the probability that a timing unit will be chosen after 4 rounds is greater or equal
to 2/3. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.22, we know that the number of rounds to
decide on other units is at most 10 on average.
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By bounding the expected number of rounds required to decide on i units from
outside of ↓1(U) by 10i, we obtain that the expected number of rounds needed for
the choice of a timing unit is not greater than∑
i>0
(
1/3
)i(
2/3 · 4 + 1/3 · 10
)
= 6 ·
∑
i>0
(
1/3
)i
= 9

3.6. Total Ordering of Units. Equipped with our well-defined and consistent
notion of timing units we are ready to present the algorithm for establishing a total
order of units. We prove that our algorithm satisfies all essential requirements, i.e.,
correctness, integrity, and liveness.
For a unit U , its timing round is the minimal k such that Tk > U , where Tk is
the k-th timing unit. Since many units can have the same timing round, the ties
will be settled via Algorithm break ties. At first, the algorithm computes hashes
of all the units in U with a hashing function φ (line 1) and then computes R as
the XOR of all of them (line 2). The XOR operation is chosen as it is not possible
to influence the value of R without controlling every hash and due to its speed.
Next, for each unit U , a new attribute tiebreaker is computed as the XOR of R
and U ’s hash (lines 3− 4). Then, the set U is topologically sorted settling ties via
tiebreaker values (lines 6− 10), and the total ordering is returned (line 11).
Algorithm 4: break ties(A,U)
// φ - hashing function
1 H ← ∅
2 for U ∈ U do
3 H ← H ∪ {φ(U)}
4 R← XORHi∈HHi
5 for U ∈ U do
6 U.tiebreaker← φ(U) XOR R
7 L← empty ordered list
8 while U 6= ∅ do
9 M ← minimal elements of U
10 U ← U \M
11 sort M by tiebreaker values
12 extend L with M
13 return L
Now we are ready to state the final theorem, proving the most fundamental
properties of the Aleph protocol:
Theorem 3.24. The Aleph protocol for agreement on total ordering of units sat-
isfies the following properties:
- Correctness - all correct processes will end up with the same ordering,
- Integrity - All decisions made by correct processes are irreversible,
- Liveness - all correct processes will eventually decide with probability 1.
Proof.
Correctness Due to Lemma 3.17(ii), correct processes decide unanimously on
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whether a prime unit is chosen to be a timing unit. Since the ordering is determin-
istic after timing units are agreed upon, all correct processes are bound to create
the same total order of units.
Integrity Again by Lemma 3.17(ii), we observe that when the function ∆ decides
on a unit U at some level l, the decision is bound to stay the same on all levels
> l. Since the rest of the protocol is based solely on these fundamental decisions,
integrity naturally follows.
Liveness Since new levels in the poset are guaranteed to be created by Lemma
3.12, we have that the poset will reach any required level eventually. Let U be a
unit in the poset. If U is issued by a correct process, then U will eventually be
gossiped to at least 2/3N other correct processes, which will eventually build their
units above it. After correct processes issue units above U in level l, all timing
units issued by the correct processes at level l+1 will be above U . There exists at
least one of these units, say V , such that there is a prime unit of level l + 1 high
above V . As such, from Lemma 3.11, we obtain that all prime units of level l + 4
and above are high above U . Finally, all timing units chosen among prime units of
levels l+4 and above will be high above U ; hence, U will be ordered as soon as any
timing unit is chosen and occurs on level l + 4 + 6 on average, via Theorem 3.23.

3.7. Fast Unit Validation. Consensus on a total ordering of all messages is a com-
plex task and requires multiple rounds of communication between all processes. In
this section we prove a much faster mechanism, guaranteeing that only one version
of each message will be accepted by the network, without the need of ordering of
all messages. One of its potential use cases is in a token exchange system, where
this scheme can provide a method for quick digital asset transfers without the risk
of two or more conflicting transactions being accepted. The mechanism is based on
the following definition:
Definition 3.25. A unit U will be considered validated for a process A if there
is a unit V in its local view such that V is high-above U and V is not above any
forks of U (even if some exists in A’s local view). We will denote this in short as
validatedA(U) = True. In such a scenario, the unit V will be referred to as U ’s
validator.
Note that a given unit can have more than one validator. A straightforward
application of Lemma 3.10 gives the following corollary.
Corollary 3.26. No two forking units can both be validated in the poset.
Proof. On the contrary, assume that U0 and U1 are forking units that are both
validated by V0, V1 respectively. Since V0 ≫ U0 and V1 ≫ U1, we obtain by
Lemma 3.10, that either V0 > U1 or V1 > U0, contradicting validation of one of the
units. 
The following theorem states that the validation property of a unit satisfies the
fundamental requirements of Byzantine agreement.
Theorem 3.27. Validation of units satisfies the following properties while tolerat-
ing up to 1/3 faulty processes:
- Correctness - no two correct processes can decide differently on validity of
a unit,
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- Integrity - at most one version of every unit can get validated by a correct
process,
- Liveness - every correct process eventually validates each non-forking unit
with probability 1.
Proof.
Correctness. If a correct process A decides that a unit U is valid, then there
exists a unit V ∈ PA such that V validates U . While A continues gossiping, all
other correct processes will eventually receive the unit V , and hence validate U .
Integrity. This a direct consequence of Corollary 3.26.
Liveness. Let U be a non-forking unit created by a process A. Due to Lemma
3.12, the unit U will eventually reach 2/3N correct processes. Due to the random
choice of the second parent of every unit, each of these correct processes will in-
evitably issue a unit above U and gossip it back to A, either directly, or via other
correct processes. The process A, after adding 2/3N units above U created by differ-
ent processes, is bound to eventually create a unit V above all of them, and hence
validate the unit U . The unit V , will then reach all the other correct processes,
again, due to Lemma 3.12. 
Note that this concept is not meant as a stand-alone mechanism, but rather as an
additional feature to be used with the main ordering algorithm. Let us consider a
case where messages are token transactions and all of the processes shares the ledger
with all accounts. If a user A has funds on his account and is willing to transfer
it, ordering this transaction according to all other transaction is not crucial. What
is crucial, however, is to ensure that this transaction will be accounted for after all
previous A’s transactions and that there will be no other version of this transaction
accepted by the network (i.e., no conflicting transaction). This can be achieved
utilizing the above definition of validation – if some A’s transaction T is conveyed
in a validated unit, and all previous A’s transactions are validated, then T can be
safely accounted for, provided that A has enough funds on the account. If however,
A has insufficient funds, the system needs to wait for the total ordering, since there
is a possibility that there was a transaction issued by some other node then A
transferring funds to A’s account.
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